Give arms control a chance

Though many experts warn against the pitfalls of history-repeating-itself predictions, "the past" remains a basis to understand the present. One cannot help but noticing the traces of past mindset and rhetoric in the emerging strategic confrontation between the US and Russia.

Whoever thought that sans ideological rift the two powers would again become enemies, targeting each other with nuclear weapons under the rubric of deterrence? Of course, we are not there yet, but it may be sooner than we imagine. Has that "adversarial partnership" been found useful to lend some familiarity to the new situation?

While reporting the latest missile tests by Russia, a Russian correspondent for an Indian newspaper gleefully informed the readers that the missile tests had "blasted to pieces" the US' assessment of Russian defense capabilities. He ended the dispatch with a prediction: "It looks like the US goal of achieving nuclear primacy could remain a pipe dream."

The 29 May testing of RS-24 ICBM and a short-range cruise missile has a familiar ring to it. The new ICBM is claimed to replace the aging RS-18 and RS-20 missiles. Two decades ago, RS-20 (then SS-20) was a bone of contention between the East and West as both camps indulged in competitive modernizations and accused each other of deploying new and more powerful systems.

At that time, arms control treaties like SALT and ABM were reference points of engagement. Now it is confusion and anarchy as the US abrogated the ABM and refused to negotiate with Russia on arms reductions. Washington apparently feared that indulging in bilateral arms control with Russia would dilute its claims of a unipolar world. Russia appears set to start its own competitive abrogation of treaties.

The emergence of an assertive Russia may or may not baffle the US, depending on how one reads the situation. But it is bound to create nightmares across the Eurasian landmass.

Two reasons might have compelled Moscow to flex its nuclear muscle. The immediate and openly offered provocation is the US' plans to deploy its missile defense systems in central Europe. Russia feels the attempt is to make its "deterrence" redundant. The other and more sobering reason is that Russia is loath to accept an inferior status, for it enjoyed equality with the US as a super power during the Cold War. In any case, even for the Soviet Union, primacy through military power was the first option.

How else would Russia have responded to missile deployments along its borders and against its wishes, except recalling the old Containment? The purpose here is not to overstretch the analogy of past, but to highlight how the world is slipping into that familiar territory.

No doubt, the coming arms race is unlikely to assume the proportions of the Cold War.

Devoid of ideological zeal and also resources, Russia will not embark on a global competition with the US. But that is no consolation to Europe. On the day of the missile tests, President Vladimir Putin warned against turning Europe into a "powder keg."

The present action-reaction cycle should not be treated as an exception. The irrational exuberance caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent Unipolar claims have resulted in the present crisis. One unfortunate victim of it all is that sound and sensible process called arms control.

For three decades between 1960 and 1990, arms control had provided both the camps with a framework to engage in dialogue and manage differences that appeared at times irreconcilable.

At its core, arms control has a few basics: Peace may elude us, but stability is possible; adversaries should initially ignore differences and find mutually beneficial points of engagement; constant dialogue not only provides a barometer to the state of relations, but actually helps in reducing mutual suspicions and tensions, etc.

However, disarmament purists and unil