The CIA as a weapon of mass destruction

A friend of mine in Washington often says that the Western World faces three main threats: Bin Laden, the State Department and the CIA. And it is not at all clear which threat is the most significant. Well, now that the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) has been elaborated and partially published, the CIA, the real engine behind the American intelligence community, has gained sufficient points to compete for the somewhat dubious honour of occupying first place on this particular podium.

"We are strongly convinced that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in autumn 2003." In view of this declaration, which has caused so much damage, the efforts to track down weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq now seem absurd: the real WMD were located rather nearer the White House, specifically in Langley, on the outskirts of Washington DC.

By considering Iran’s nuclear programme to have been halted, the NIE has called an end to a great number of things. First and foremost is George W. Bush’s policy of suffocating the Teheran regime by exercising greater political pressure and imposing stricter sanctions. Sources within the President’s circle that claim that the NIE demonstrates the need to maintain the pressure on the Ayatollahs simply reflects their vain attempts to salvage what they can. Whether we like it or not, the time has come for the Bush Administration to end its rhetoric of confrontation. The approach of “al options are on the table” is no longer tenable.

Second, the NIE has stripped the White House of its main reason for pushing for further sanctions on the UN Security Council. If securing these sanctions was always going to be a tricky matter, now the balance has clearly swung in favour of those who advocate a more conciliatory approach to Teheran. Very soon the Russians will authorise the delivery of fissionable material for the Busher reactor and nobody will be able to firmly oppose them.

Third, the NIE has blown away the incipient intra-European consensus regarding policy towards Iran. Whilst London and Paris had remained united in their belief that it was necessary to continue punishing the Ayatollah regime in economic, financial and technological terms, Germany, the European country that has the strongest trade links with the Islamic Republic, has never been that enthusiastic about imposing further sanctions. Now it is going to be a true diplomatic challenge to encourage Berlin to back a policy based on a firm approach.

The NIE will also have a negative affect on the project to set up an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. The purpose of this shield, as Washington has insisted time and again, is not to fend off the Russian nuclear arsenal, but to handle quantitatively inferior threats... such as a long-range Iranian missile. In view of the political cost of this operation, especially in terms of public image, not to mention the friction it has caused with Russia, it is more than doubtful that things will be the same as they were before the new NIE was announced. The same could be said for the debate within the heart of NATO regarding the urgent need to extend the tactical anti-missile system so that it encompasses European territories and populations and so that its compatibility and integration with the American system can also be promoted. The NIE’s verdict is that the costs would be too high for too little in return.

And what about the damage that has been inflicted on the President’s own image? George W. Bush has been shown to be incapable of controlling his own bureaucracy, leaving him high and dry with a hard-line approach that no longer has any basis. What will be the reaction of America’s new and enthusiastic allies, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, who has become the standard-bearer of the sanctions policy almost overnig